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political economic formations more generally. Although I understand "communication" as the movement of meanings between people and "communications" (or communication technologies) as the means by which those meanings are moved, for the purposes of this chapter I am conflating these two definitions in the term "communication". I am aware that such a definition may be criticised for confounding two very distinct perspectives on how we make, move, and exchange meanings by collapsing the "content" and "technologies" of human communication, but such a terminological move is not altogether a matter of convenience in the thoroughly technologised communication environments in which we live. Further, the perspective it implies can be understood in terms of Silverstone's mediation approach and has the advantage of not separating meaning from its means of movement (Silverstone, 1999) . The only exception I make to this act of terminological conflation is in reference to "new media", by which I mean periods in time during which new technologies become prominent and widespread means of communication. I use the term "new media" in a technological sense to denote new means of movement for communication.
Roots
As a recognised field of study, political economy of communication has its most obvious roots in the concept of 'knowledge monopolies' as developed by Canadian economist Harold Innis (1942 Innis ( , 1944 Innis ( , 1950 Innis ( , 1951a Innis ( , 1951b . Innis coined this term to illustrate the fact that throughout history certain privileged groups (priests, kings, bureaucrats, soldiers, scientists, etc) have enjoyed a monopoly of access to certain kinds of knowledge. Innis therefore tends to appear as the pioneer of all political contemporary economic studies in the field of media. Of course even from the period during which Innis wrote we must also acknowledge Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/1998) whose essay on 4 the 'culture industry' continues to have relevance for current circumstances (Silverstone, 1999) . But I believe we cannot stop here in identifying the historical development of the field. Political economy of communication becomes visible during the second decade of the twentieth century, when such figures as Harold Lasswell (1927 Lasswell ( , 1941 and Edward Bernays (1928 Bernays ( , 1945 appear as significant scholars in the study of mass communication strategies. Both clearly understand the political economic implications of new media and their attendant capabilities to change the character and functioning of societies. At this time, we see a concern with 'propaganda', a term that did not have the automatically negative connotations it carries today.
According to Lasswell, Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols. The word attitude is taken to mean a tendency to act according to certain patterns of evaluation. The existence of an attitude is not a direct datum of experience, but an inference from science which have a conventionalised significance. … The valuational patterns upon which this inference is founded may be primitive gestures of the face and body, or more sophisticated gestures of the pen and voice. Taken together, these objects which have a standard meaning in a group are called significant symbols. The elevated eyebrow, the clenched fist, the sharp voice, the pungent phrase, have their references established within the web of a particular culture. Such significant symbols are paraphernalia employed in expressing the attitudes, and they are also capable of being employed to reaffirm or redefine attitudes. (Lasswell, 1927: 627, my emphasis) Lasswell's is a political economic understanding of communication. 'Patterns of evaluation' and 'valuational patterns' are other ways to say "value", which is both an abstract and a concrete term. When it functions as a noun, "value" is a huge abstraction, a generality that incorporates many aspects of human experience. However as a verb it can become very concrete and particular-particular people actively value particular ways of being, seeing, and acting; particular types of food, entertainment, and politics; particular 5 codes of morality and traditions of kinship; and so on. By recognising that 'patterns of evaluation' within 'the web of a particular culture' are the primary objects of propaganda, Lasswell does not separate the economic from the political. People evaluating aspects of the world in historically and culturally particular ways, and then acting upon those evaluations in negative or positive ways, is how specific cultural values get produced. An important point Lasswell makes here is that, to be effective objects of propaganda, 'symbols' must first enjoy a degree of culturally shared significance. Communication therefore plays a central role in what people do because it is through communication that symbols gain significance within a culture. Similarly, communication is the means by which significant symbols are attributed with positive and negative attributes, thus altering patterns of evaluation towards particular cultural objects. In turn, actions towards "symbols"-which in Lasswell's definition can include persons, whole countries, religions, ethnic groups, and political roles-change (Lasswell, 1941) . This is not as abstract or idealist as it might seem. Lasswell's 'collective attitude' is not on a 'plane apart from individual actions ' (1927: 628) . Rather, he sees 'the collective attitude' as a 'pattern' which designates 'standard uniformities of conduct at a given time and place ' (1927: 628) . The 'collective attitude' is a 'distribution of individual acts and not an indwelling spirit which has achieved transitory realization in the rough, coarse facts of the world of sense ' (1927: 628) . Lasswell differentiates the techniques of attitude change by psychological means from means of propaganda. Psychological means require having 'access to the individual's private stock of meanings', whereas propaganda is based on 'the standard meanings of the groups of which the individual is a member' and therefore requires anthropological and sociological understandings (1927: 628).
Lasswell's is not a crude structuralist understanding of group behaviour. He sees that the 6 individual moves through what are now known as multiple 'discourse communities', and that each of these groups has its own peculiar attitudinal patterns that can be manipulated (cf. Lemke, 1995) . Attitudinal patterns are typical but not universal within a given group (Lemke, 1998) . They are materially formed and enacted.
For Lasswell, propaganda may be positive or negative, but its object is always cultural values:
Every cultural group has its vested values … An object toward which it is hoped to arouse hostility must be presented as a menace to as many of these values as possible. There are always ambitious hopes of increasing values, and the object must be made to appear as a stumbling block to their realization. There are patterns of right and wrong, and the object must be made to flout the good. There are standards of propriety, and the object must appear ridiculous and gauche. If the plan is to draw out positive attitudes toward an object, it must be presented, not as a menace and an obstruction, nor as despicable or absurd, but as a protector of our values, a champion of our dreams, and a model of virtue and propriety. (1927: 630) The means by which desirable or undesirable attitudes are organised towards the objects of propaganda are not oriented towards making people accept 'an idea without reflection', nor are they even concrete "suggestions"; they are, rather, the manipulation of 'cultural material with a recognizable meaning ' (1927: 631) . Moreover, all means of propaganda are a 'form of words', whether 'spoken, written, pictorial, or musical, and the number of stimulus carriers is infinite ' (1927: 631) . Because of 'technological changes', especially the new medium of radio, increased literacy, and because most of what could 'formerly be done by violence and coercion must now be done by argument and persuasion', Lasswell asserts that propaganda is in fact necessary for the operation of democracy (1927: 631).
His view is that because of advances in communication technologies, increased literacy, and the widespread 'ventilation of opinions and the taking of votes', democracy 'has proclaimed the dictatorship of palaver, and the technique of dictating to the dictator is 7 named propaganda ' (1927: 631) . There is an inseparable and concrete link between the political and the economic here: the production and manipulation of attitudinal patterns ("values") is the means by which political outcomes are achieved in democracy.
For Edward Bernays (1928) , generally considered by the modern Public Relations industry as its pioneer, propaganda is primarily psychological but still oriented towards the formation of attitudinal meaning: 'from the broadest standpoint, [propaganda] is the power of the [ruling] group to sway the larger public in its attitude ' (1928: 958) . The technique of propaganda is 'the psychology of public persuasion ' (1928: 959) . But, he notes, sociological techniques are just as important to successful propaganda as those of psychology (1928: 961) . The process of 'manipulating public opinion' begins with 'statistics' and 'field-surveying ' (1928: 961) . Knowledge of 'group cleavages of society, the importance of group leaders, and the habits of their followers' are essential knowledge for the successful propagandist (1928: 961) . Armed with such knowledge, the propagandist must learn how, within given groups, to make 'an old principle apply to a new idea'; to substitute 'ideas by changing clichés'; to overcome prejudices, to make 'a part stand for the whole'; and to create 'events and circumstances that stand for his ideas ' (1928: 961) . Bernays considers that 'a circumstance or circumstances of dramatic moment' are events that change and establish the 'functioning of given attitudes toward given subjects, such as religion, sex, race, morality, nationalism, internationalism, and so forth ' (1928: 961) . Whether the object is attitudes towards hats, sexuality, or God, Bernays argues that, in the 'age of mass production', there must be a corresponding 'technique for the mass distribution of ideas' and attitudes, and thus for the mass production of public attitudes (1928: 971) . Whether 'salad dressing' or a US 'presidential 8 candidate', means of production oriented towards the formation of attitudinal meaning are entirely a matter of understanding and manipulating socially shared attitudes (1928: 971) .
In the propagandists' work we see an increasing emphasis on the role of communication in the production of values and power. We also see a strong emphasis on the relationship between economic and political power. Merely a decade after Bernays and Lasswell wrote on the manipulation of public opinion, there is already widespread concern about the amounts of money being spent on US election campaigns (Poole, 1939: 371) . But this is merely a quantitative aspect of a qualitative change in the way patterns of evaluation are produced within the public sphere. Elections and opinion polls are ways of arriving at 'value judgements ' (1939: 371) . Poole claims that at the most fundamental level 'there is a choice between divine and human judgement', and that having given God They are honestly disposed to believe that the "voice of the people" (that is a majority) is the voice of God or Truth; or, to state the matter less theologically, that in a human world the best value judgement is the judgement of the greatest number of humans on any given problem at any given time. This is the quantitative or statistical, as opposed to the solely qualitative, idea. We have come to be so committed to it in our political philosophy that the cost and fuss and noise of the elections and polls are taken for granted-even welcomed, as adornments of our political life, which perhaps they are. (1939: 374).
The historical search for 'judgements in the dimension of time' is firstly based on 'the qualitative or heroic principle', a kind of '"Gallup poll" taken in the dimension of time '. (1939: 375) . Thus with the introduction of Gallup's (1938) techniques, 'value judgements in the domain of public affairs are come to, apparently, by an interesting, and rather reassuring, interaction and cross-control between the qualitative and quantitative principles operating in the two dimensions of time and space' (Poole, 1939: 375) . Poole appeals to an apparently static set of value judgements set in past and based on the 'heroic' quality of past judgements, and the 'statistical' judgements of the great mass of people as measured by techniques such as those of Gallup (1938) and Bernays (1928) . Gallup (1938) held no such conceptions of historical balance in matters of judgement, preferring to think of the perfect democracy as an immediate relationship between political action and ongoing measurements of public opinion: James Bryce said that the next and final stage in our democracy would be reached if the will of the majority of citizens were to be ascertainable at all times.
With the development of the science of measuring public opinion, it can be stated with but few qualifications, that this stage in our democracy is rapidly being reached. It is now possible to ascertain, with a high degree of accuracy, the views of the people on all national issues. (Gallup, 1938: 9) For Gallup, the usefulness of polling is not to be confined to government or politics. It can be 'equally useful in the field of social problems ' (1938: 13) . Once sufficient is known about specific attitudes -opinions about welfare, religious prejudice, venereal disease, and any problem of attitude whatsoever -they can be addressed 'with equal success ' (1938: 13-14) . Therefore 'with many of our leading psychologists and social scientists' interested in the problem of measuring public opinion, 'it will not be long before the final stage in the development of our democracy, as described by Bryce, has been reachedthat the will of the majority of citizens can be ascertained at all times ' (1938: 14) .
Questions about the relationship between the "facts" of public opinion research, the possibility of centralised control of mass communication, and the quality of government and its organs appear to elude Gallup in his enthusiasm for an early end to the history of democracy. These questions, muted and blurred by Gallup's enthusiasms for direct democracy, were answered with a resounding blast from Western Europe, the shockwaves of which are still being felt today.
Political economy of communication in Nazi Germany
No political economy of communication can exclude the remarkable efforts of the Nazi Germany propagandists to produce new cultural patterns of evaluation, and therefore new politics, on a massive scale. For the Nazis, like Bernays and Lasswell, propaganda is qualitatively different from advertising; it is a matter of moral obligation to the public, a value and public good in itself:
Political propaganda may not be confused with advertising. Advertising changes its target as needed. … Advertising agencies push one thing today, another tomorrow, each time making it sound as if nothing else in the world is worth mentioning. There is no thought of moral or national values. "Ballyhoo" is advertising at any price, with no moral content, no moral thought or responsibility. The Americans made "ballyhoo" against Germany during the World War until the American public finally believed that the Germans were cannibals whose elimination would be a godly deed. "Ballyhoo" is unlimited, arbitrary exaggeration. In a political sense, it is incitement, distortion, and it is all immoral.
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When we talk about the necessity of political propaganda, we seek powerful moral goals.
We want to make our people a united nation that confidently and clearly understands National Socialism's policies, quickly and correctly. We cannot change our political principles as we would a consumer good, becoming random, irresponsible and immoral.
We do not want to distort, confuse or incite, rather clarify, unify, and tell the truth.
Political propaganda is the highest responsibility, it is a moral duty, a national duty. We may never think there is too much of it, or that it is superfluous. (Wells, 1936) Moral and national values are conflated in Nazi political economy of communication. The following summarises the position: 'For us, gold is not a measure of the value of money.
Our foundation is German labor and confidence in the Führer' (Lange, in NSDAP, 1939) .
"Attitude" and "value" are also synonymous for the Nazi propagandists. These are testable aspects of human experience which are open to profitable manipulation:
The National Socialist worldview is an attitude, an attitude that must show a courageous face to the outside, but domestically be infused with camaraderie. If the people are to continue to believe in the National Socialist movement, the movement must maintain and guard this camaraderie and pass it on to the future. The struggle behind us is unique.
Future generations will be spared such a struggle. It must be replaced by a firm attitude, which can only be tested in every day life. Our task is to reawaken the old values of courage and pride in our people, and to do all that we see as necessary.
… world history today must be rewritten, and that we will do the rewriting. It would be a mistake to delegate the task to the teachers and professors who wrote previous histories, for they grew up under the old world and were educated in it. The 2000 year old Christian age is dying and a new national Socialist world under Adolf Hitler is being born. The youth are growing up in this new world. Our task is to serve these ideas and to lead the struggle. Then we will be able to look confidently into the future. (Rosenberg, 1939 , in NSDAP, 1939 .
The paranoid values of eugenics, social Darwinism, and the natural state of an allpervasive competition for survival were propagated throughout Germany, through film (Hippler, 1937) ; radio (Goebbels, 1933) ; printed materials, and by every means and available to the propagandists, including cultural gatherings, mass marches, 'stickers', and especially through the spoken and written word (Stark, 1930) . Children were not to be excluded from the logic that inheres in seeing our world as a manifestation of the competition of every living thing against every other. A fifth-grade text-book 'for young girls' from the Nazi era is instructive here:
We have established that all creatures, plants as well as animals, are in a continual battle for survival. Plants crowd into the area they need to grow. Every plant that fails to secure enough room and light must necessarily die. Every animal that does not secure sufficient territory and guard it against other predators, or lacks the necessary strength and speed or caution and cleverness will fall prey to its enemies. The army of plant eaters threatens the plant kingdom. Plant eaters are prey for carnivores. The battle for existence is hard and unforgiving, but is the only way to maintain life. This struggle eliminates everything that is unfit for life, and selects everything that is able to survive. (Harm and Wiehle, 1942, p. 168) A pattern of valuing and corollary imperatives for action were produced in the mass propagation of such understandings. Appeals to fear; immutable laws of nature; a traumatised mass psychology; doctrines of scarce resources; work as the highest good; the necessity of being the dominant nation; racial "hygiene" and superiority; the utilitarian view of science, technology, and truth-these formed the basis of Nazi propaganda. The comprehensive range of the Nazis' appeals, combined with the centralised control of public communication, had intense, widespread, and vicious effects. The sole objective of Nazi propaganda was quite simple: to change the nation's "patterns of evaluation"-put abstractly, to produce new "values" on a national scale to achieve particular political ends. The task of Nazi propaganda is to free those who today still are rooted and anchored in the foreign ideas of liberalism and Marxism, to make them feel, think and act according to National Socialism, to bring them to the point where they judge and evaluate everything according to National Socialist principles. (Dietz, 1934 , my emphasis)
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The nation's patterns of evaluation were successfully manipulated by the Party, and the rest, as they say, is history. It may seem reductionist and cold to say that Nazi Germany owed its short-lived "successes" to a sophisticated understanding of political economy of communication, but it is difficult to deny that the regime successfully set out to achieve the production of an entirely new set of values for German people, that its communication strategies were oriented towards the production of those values, and that in achieving its objectives, the Nazi regime produced a literal explosion of activity that moved according to the patterns of evaluation that were produced.
Contemporary concerns
Starting with Harold Innis (1942, 1944, 1950, 1951a, 1951b) ' (1950, 1951a, 1951b) . He also helpfully expanded conceptions of media, just as the term was becoming singular and Jr (1940 Jr ( , 1965 Jr ( , 1974 , Lewis Mumford (1961 , Langdon Winner (1986) , and David F. Noble (1997) , to be included in political economies of communication. Their inclusion in the field recognises the fact that technologies have a communicative dimension and play a significant role in political economic formations: as much of means of production for capitalism or whichever system of political economy in which specific technologies appear, they are also means of producing culturally and historically specific systems of meaning. While such inclusions sometimes threaten to place too much emphasis on the "purely" technological, the foregrounding of the technological and its social character has been an important development in political economies of communication, one that has yet to be fully incorporated into the field. Perhaps that is because what has become "mainstream" in the field takes as its definition of "value" the purely monetary dimension, and a seeming monolith, "The Media", as its primary object of study. This is akin to the emergence of what has become mainstream 'economics', after economics broke away from the 15 remnants of late-nineteenth classical political economy, approximately between the years of 1916-1920 (Graham, 2003) .
Contemporary "mainstream" approaches
By "mainstream" I mean those scholars who are most influential in the field of political economy of communication and who, through scholarly political economies of communication, define the field. Most of these studies focus on mass media ownership and its broad societal effects (eg Garnham, 1990; Schiller, 1996; McChesney, 2000; McChesney & Schiller, 2003 , Bagdikian, 1997 Mansell, 2004; Wasko, 2001; Mosco, 1996; Mosco & Foster, 2001 ). In McChesney's definition, the focus is on how 'media and communication systems and content' do certain things ('reinforce', 'influence') to 'existing class and social relations', with a special focus on the role of 'economic factors'; and, second, how 'ownership, support mechanisms, and government policies influence media behaviour and content'.
The main difficulty I have with McChesney's definition is that it appears to lack a theory of value, or at the very least appears to presuppose one. This is most apparent when
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'economic factors' are taken for granted and are entirely separated from 'politics and social relations' by being placed in subjective relation to them. That is to say: 'economic factors' (the subject) act upon 'politics and social relations' (the object). In the second part of the definition, this relation is reversed to some degree. Here, 'ownership' (an economic factor), 'support systems' such as 'advertising' (another economic factor: revenue) and policies (the primary product of 'politics') are subject and 'media behaviour and content' are object. Value is sidelined, politics, social structure, social relations, and economic factors are separated, only to be placed in apparently arbitrary transitive relationships with each other. Much of this can be explained through a history of intellectual history. Economics, politics, and sociology, along with the totality of social sciences, have been slowly "disciplined"-separated from each other in theory-from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards (Graham, 2003) . This, even though they are now more closely (Graham, 2004) . Any critical theory integrates fractured aspects of social science (Marcuse and Neumann, 1942/1998: 95) and must therefore begin with an integrated formulation of value (Marx 1973: 259) .
Where communication is concerned, the evaluative dimension extends far beyond the "purely economic", which is to say the pecuniary dimension of value, or more commonly, money (Graham, 2001) . The exercise of power and the production of values are inextricable, and power is merely one form of value translated into another (Graham, 2002 To such an end Robin Mansell (2004) argues that 'a revitalization of the political economy of media and communications' is required 'in order to achieve a more holistic account of the dynamics of new media production and consumption ' (2004: 97) . The core of the argument is that being embedded in our technologically-mediated interactions? ' (2004: 103) . "Power" can be a manifestation of prestige, or strength, or wealth, or institutional standing, or various combinations of these values, along with many others (Graham, 2002) .
There are other difficulties with Mansell's argument, not the least of which is the assumption that effective power in political economies of communication operates on the principle of 'scarce' resources when it seems the opposite is most likely to be true. This can be seen if we take the propagandists' work into account, or the work of the Creel Committee (Graham & Luke, 2003) . The more resources for communication that are made available in a political economic system, the more effectively political economies of communication can operate in significant ways to produce new values. To make mass networks of mediation effective, and to weave masses of people into networks of mediation, both means and content must be produced and distributed in abundance. That is how new evaluative patterns are produced in a given social system. Questions of value in political economies of communication are not therefore concerned with what is scarce, but rather with what is produced, exchanged, distributed, and "consumed" in abundance.
Of course the products of mediation are rarely (if ever) consumed, even though they might certainly be "used". Moreover, whether "technologies" or "contents", they gain in values the more they are used, entirely in contradiction to laws of value for most other commodity forms. This is all the more so in digital networks, where digitised symbolic artefacts never (in theory) deteriorate with age.
As it is defined in the mainstream, political economy of communication systems, it is primarily concerned with capitalist societies and commercial media systems, as these models dominate across the world (Mosco, 1996) . While I agree that it is necessary to consider the political economy of communication as a context for most questions pertaining to communication, I disagree with Mosco's assertion that the capitalist system dominates the world. It ignores the emergence and triumph of corporatism throughout the course of the twentieth century (Saul, 1997; Graham & Luke 2003) (Carey, 1989) . The East India Company of the mercantilist era was no more able to function without its ships than is the Hughes Electronics media corporation able to function without its satellites. Mercantilism, advances in navigation and shipping, the emergence of a general credit system, and the rise of the merchant class as a political force are mutually defining phenomena in history (Nace, 2003: 22-4) . The elements of political economy cannot be separated and understood at the same time.
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McChesney and Schiller (2003) The authors attribute to 'neoliberalism' the ways in which global political economies of communication have formed around new media. To say that, except for 'neoliberalism', 'new digital communications could have been used … simply to enhance public service provision' is similar to saying that, "except for fascism, radio could have been used to promote peace and understanding in the mid-twentieth century"-that is to say, it ignores the "economic" part of political economies. The corporations that produce new media are the same corporations that have most benefited from them. New media are not produced according to the needs and wants of a social totality, a 'society' that chooses to use them in one way or another. Rather, new media are produced within specific contexts according to particular interests and particular values, precisely to increase and expand those values.
As Silverstone points out, '[g]lobal economies and global finance cannot work without a global information infrastructure'; they are in fact the basis of 'globalisation ' (1999: 144 ).
Yet, he says, global corporations 'are threatened by the same media technologies' they rely upon to operate, again because of the values they promote: 'speed can kill and undo
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reason as well as facilitate transactions and speculations ' (1999: 144) . This appears to be happening as I write.
Towards a coherent theory and method for political economies of communication Four writers stand out to me as providing the basic elements from which to synthesise a coherent approach to political economy of communication: Dallas Smythe (1981) , Karl Marx (1973) , Roger Silverstone (1999) , and Jay Lemke (1995) . This Smythe's is an historically and culturally specific, materialist definition of human experience that explains how we comprehend our world as a totality. Consciousnessbeing conscious-is a significant aspect of human activity. It includes how we evaluate our world. As I have said here, perhaps too many times already, the ways in which we evaluate various aspects of our world-what are ordinarily called our "values"-is an 23 essential inclusion in any political economy of communication. Marx is worth quoting here:
To develop the concept of capital it is necessary to begin not with labour but with value, and, precisely, with exchange value in an already developed movement of circulation. It is just as impossible to make the transition directly from labour to capital as it is to go from the different human races directly to the banker, or from nature to the steam engine. (Marx, 1973: 259) While it may start with a theory of exchange values, political economy needs to go beyond traditional understandings of value. As our political economic systems have This general tendency is exemplified in terms like "knowledge worker" and "knowledge economy". Terms like these presuppose forms of labour that can be bought and sold in order to produce artefacts of conscious activity, or what might be called 'knowledge commodities' (Graham 1999 (Graham 2000 . These, in turn, can be alienated from their source (conscious human activity), technologically objectified, and then traded within an emergent "global economy". This emergent economy is organised primarily around the production of symbolic artefacts and is facilitated by proliferating new media. With this progression, new and more abstract forms of value have developed that correspond to the newly-formalised "labours of abstraction" in the knowledge economy. These forms of value are not merely monetary, although they may be traded for money at some stage. They need to be understood, and I have argued elsewhere that language is the way into this system. It is uncontentious to say that money values permeate societies everywhere and that this has 24 significant impacts on how they operate. But the enthronement of money as the primary evaluative principle cannot be explained by the character of money itself. Somehow it gets to be this way through the promotion of the significance of money as a value. This, I argue, is achieved by the manipulation of other aspects of value, which in turn necessarily requires the movement of meanings from one set of institutional contexts (the commercial) into all other aspects of human experience (Graham, 2001) . Consequently political economy of communication requires a theory of movement that incorporates the dimensions of space and time:
Mediation involves the movement of meaning from one text to another, from one discourse to another, from one event to another. It involves the constant transformation of meanings, both large scale and small, significant and insignificant, as media texts and texts about media circulate in writing, in speech and audiovisual forms, and as we, individually and collectively, directly and indirectly, contribute to their production (Silverstone, 1999: 13) Mediation moves meanings through and across space and time, linking and delinking spaces, places, and times (1999: 14) . The process of mediation 'involves the work of institutions, groups and technologies' and is 'the product of textual unravelling in the words, deeds and experiences of everyday life, as much as by the continuities of broadcasting and narrowcasting ' (1999: 15) .
With these three concepts, framed in these particular ways, we have the basis for theoretically grasping the basic elements of political economies of communication.
Analytically, this leaves us to understand the various dimensions of meaning itself. These can be described within a three-term system as defined by Lemke (1995) : the Presentational, or the "aboutness" of meaning; the Attitudinal, or the evaluative aspects of meaning; and the Organisational, or how meanings derive coherence.
25
Through the synthesis of these authors' theories and methods, the ways in which political economies of communication work can be grasped in relation to political economy more generally and particular instances of communication. There are many sites that need to be understood in the current context, violent, vicious, and destructive as it is.
Politics, finance, and military propaganda; resistance, revolution, and technological change; commercial production, distribution, exchange, and consumption; fundamentalisms of all sorts, peace activism, and environmental struggles throughout the consciousness is produced; ways in which values are produced; the means by which meanings are moved; and the ways in which these aspects are realised in specific meanings. Through the synthesis of these aspects of political economy, we can begin to chart a course through one of the most complex and gigantic systems of social relations that has developed in the history of humanity.
